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Entropy Estimation for Optical PUFs Based on Context-Tree Weighting Methods© Tanya Ignatenko, Frans Willems, Geert-Jan Schrijen, Boris Skorié, and Pim Tuyls In this chapter we discuss estimation of the secrecy rate of fuzzy sources-more specifically of optical physical unclonable functions (PUFs)-using context-tree weighting (CTW) methods [291] . We show that the entropy of a stationary 2-D source is a limit of a series of conditional entropies [6] and extend this result to the conditional entropy of one 2-D source given another one. Furthermore, we show that the general CTW-method approaches the source entropy also in the 2-D stationary case. Moreover, we generalize Maurer's result [196] to the ergodic case, thus showing that we get realistic estimates of the achievable secrecy rate. Finally, we use these results to esti niate the secrecy rate of speckle patterns from optical PUFs.
Generating a Shared Secret Key
Consider a source that generates seciuences of random variables from a finite alphabet. A shared secret key can be produced by two terminals if these terminals observe dependent sequences and at least one of the terminals is allowed to transmit a message to the other one. Although the transmit ted message is public, it needs not reveal information about the secret key that is generated. This concept was described by Maurer [196] when he realized that the secrecy capacity of a broadcast channel could be signifi cantly enhanced if a public feedback link from the (legitimate) receiver to the transmitter was present. A little later, Ahlswede and Csiszflr [4] investigated similar problems and called the situation, in which the terminals observe dc pendent sequences, the source-type model; see Fig. 13 .1. There, an encoder forms a secret S after observing a sequence X" (X1 , X2 XAI) of sym bols from the finite alphabet X. The encoder sends a public helper-message M e M = {1, 2,. .. , MI} to a decoder. The decoder observes the sequence yN = (Y1, Y2, . . . , YN) of symbols from the finite alphabet Y and produces an estimate S of the secret S using the helper-message Al. It was assumed in [196] and [4] that the sequence pair (X1v, yN) is independent and iclenti cally distributed (i.i.d.) ; that is, P[XN = xN,yN =~N] EI~f or some distribution {Q(z, y), z~X, y e Y}.
In the described model, the terminals want to produce as much key infor mation as possible. The probability that the estimated secret S is not equal to the secret S should be close to zero and the information that the helpermessage reveals about the secret should also be negligible. Finally, we are interested in the number of helper-message bits that are needed. More for mally, a secrecy rate R~is achievable if for all a > 0, for all large enough N. there exist encoders and decoders such that
P~S]<a.
Theorem 13.1. The largest possible achievable secrecy rate B3 is equal to I(X; Y). Moreover, for all a> 0, for all larqe enouqh N a helper rate -~log9 M~H(XIY)+a suffices to achieve R3 = I(X; Y). Both I(X; Y) and H(XIY) are based on the joint distribution {Q(x,y),x~X,y~Y}.
For a detailed proof of Theorem 13.1, see [196] and [4] . Here, we only provide a sketch. The achievability proof relies on random binning of the space XN (i.e., partitioning the set of typical XN_sequences into codes for the channel from X to Y). There are roughly 2ATH(~~~such codes. The index of the code containing xN is sent to the decoder. All of these codes contain approximately 2ATI(X;~') codewords. The decoder now uses~N to recover xN. If we define the secret to be the index of xN within the code, the code-index reveals practically no information about this index.
Physical Unclonable Functions
Measured responses from PUFs, which were already discussed in Chapters 1 and 12, are a good example of dependent random secluences. A typical PUF based authentication and key-agreement protocol involves an enrollment mea surement of a challenge response pair (CRP) and a verification measurement of the same CRP. (See Chapter 16.) Since these measurements are separated in time, and often performed using different hardware, there is inevitably some measurement noise, caused, for example, by differences in temperature, mois ture, and calibration. We identify the enrollment response with the sequence XN in Fig. 13 .1, and the verification response with the sequence yN,
The Maurer scheme guarantees that the helper data reveal only a negligible amount of information about the extracted key. There is no guarantee, on the other hand, that the information revealed about the PUF response XN is also small. This may pose a problem that an attacker could mimic or reproduce the PUF based on the information leaked from helper data. However, the unclonability properties of the PUF prevent this attack. Therefore. PUFs are very suitable as a source of common randomness for the Maurer scheme.
In this chapter we concentrate on optical PUFs. This type of PUF consists of a transparent material with randomly distributed scatterers. Different chal lenges are obtained by shining a laser beam under different angles onto the PUF. These challenges lead to speckle patterns (responses) that are recorded by a camera. We have analyzed data that was acquired with the experimen tal setup described in Section 15.3.1 and the glass samples of Section 15.3.2. For this setup, the measurement noise is mainly caused by inaccuracies in repositioning the samples. We have investigated five PUFs (labeled "A," "B," "C," "D," and "E"), and for each of these five PUFs, we have considered two challenges (laser angles, labeled "0" and "1"). We mapped each speckle pat tern to a 2-D binary image by Gabor filtering and thresholding as proposed by Pappu [221]; see Section 16.5. Each of the 10 challenges resulted in two binary images: an enrollment image X and a verification image Y. Our aim is to find out how much secret key information can be extracted from the image pairs (X,Y) and how this matches the results obtained with the algorithm described in Section 16.4.
Entropy of a Two-Dimensional Stationary Process
In order to find out how large the mutual information is between an enrollment image and a verification image for optical PUFs, we consider the 2-D process { X,,,~: (v, Ii)~Z2} (also called random field) and assume that it is stationary 
I-RĨ~X~1
,, ... XM,N)~XSI,I ... XM,N <0.
Lemma 13.1. The limit defined in relation (19.5) exists.
Proof. Using inequality (13.6) for (M,N) = (L,L) and, subsequently, a transposed version of this inequality for (M, N) = (L, L + 1), it follows that H(L+,)(X) -H(L)(X) < 0. Hence, the sequence H(p(X) is a non-increasing non-negative sequence in L. This concludes the proof. The definition of entropy in relation (13.5) focuses on block entropies. We will show next that the entropy of a stationary 2-D process can also be expressed as a limit of conditional entropies. To this end, we define the conditional entropy G(L)(X)~H(XL,LIX,,,,. . . ,X,,~_,,. .~.,XL,L_,).
A visualization of this definition is presented in Fig. 13 .2.
In information theory the entropy of a stationary process is usually denoted by H(X). however, in cryptography this notation is used for mm-entropy. There fore, to avoid confusion we use the notation H()(X). Fig. 13 .2. The symbol XL,L and the symbols on which it is conditioned in rela tion (13.7). © 2006 IEEE Proof. From stationarity and the fact that conditioning never increases en tropy, it follows that the sequence G(L) (X) is non-increasing in L. Since G(L)(X) ≥ 0, the proof follows.
In order to demonstrate that the limits (13.5) and (13.8) are eciual, we first observe (using the chain rule, stationarity, and the fact that conditioning never increases entropy) that
On the other hand, it follows (using similar arguments) that
where H(fl) corresponds to all the symbols in the horseshoe region~see Proof. Follows directly from (13.9) and (13.11). Our arguments are a generalization of the arguments for (1-D) stationary sources that can be found in Gallager [119] . Moreover, they a~e only slightly different from those given by Anastassiou and Sakrison [6] , who first showed that in the 2-D case, the block-entropy limit equals the conditional-entropy limit.
We conclude that the entropy of a 2-D stationary process can be computed by considering the conditional entropy of a single symbol given more and more neighboring symbols.
Conditional Entropy of a Two-Dimensional Stationary Process Given a Second One
Next, we consider the 2-D joint process~: (v. h) E Z2}. We assume that it is stationary: that is,
for any template T, any shift (sr, sa), and any observation xy~1-. Again, we as sume that the X symbols and Y symbols take values from the finite alphabets X and Y, respectively.
We may consider the joint entropy H~(XY) of the joint process XY and then obviously Theorem 13.2 holds. We can then compute this joint entropy by considering conditional entropies.
It also makes sense to look at the conditional entropy H(~)(XIY) and to find out whether a theorem similar in style to Theorem 13.2 can be proved for this situation. This turns out to be possible if we define, for positive integers L,
We first observe that since conditioning never increases entropy, the following inequality holds 2L- In order to demonstrate that the limits (13.15) and (13.18~are equal, we observe that (according to the same arguments as used for relations (13.9) and (13.10))
where H(E) corresponds to the X symbols in the edge region; see Fig. 13 .5. Hence, we obtain
Proof. The proof follows from relations (13.19) and (13.21). We conclude that, in the stationary case, also the conditional entropy of one 2-D process X given a second 2-D process Y can be computed by considering the conditional entropy of a single X symbol given more and more "causal" neighboring X symbols, and more and more "non-causal" 2 neighboring Y symbols.
Mutual Information Estimation: Convergence
We estimate the mutual information I(~)(X; Y) either by estimating H(~)(X), H(~)(Y), and H(~)(XY) or by estinmating H(~)(X) and H(~)(XIY) (or, equivalently H(~)(Y) and H(~)(YIX)) using CTW methods. CTW is a universal data compression method that achieves optimal redundancy behav ior for tree sources. It weights the coding distributions corresponding to all bounded memory tree source models and realizes an efficient coding distribu tion for unknown models with unknown parameters. This weighted distribu tion can be used for sequential data compression. In a sequential scheme, the codeword is constructed by processing the source symbols one after the other.
The basic CTW method was proposed [293] . In [294] , it was shown how to deal with more general context structures (which is necessary to determine, e.g., H~(XtY)). In [291] , it was shown that the CTW method approaches entropy in the 1-D ergodic case. The following theorem applies to the 2-D case. Proof. From Theorems 13.2 and 13.3 we conclude that we can focus on con ditional entropies of a single symbol (or pair of symbols). These are the en tropies that the CTW method achieves when the observed image gets larger and larger and more and more context symbols become relevant. It is impor tant to use the right ordering of the context symbols. Therefore, the symbols for L = 2 should be included first, then those for L = 3, and so on. The rest of the proof is similar to that in [291].
The Maurer Scheme in the Ergodic Case
Section 13.1 contains the theorem on the amount of secret-key material that can be generated from a pair of correlated sequences in the i.i.d. setting. The coding strategy outlined there is actually Slepian-Wolf coding [256] , as was observed by Ahlswede and Csiszár [4] . Cover [67] proved that the Slepian Wolf result does not only hold for i.i.d. sequences, but it carries over to the ergodic case. Therefore, we can generalize Theorem 13.1 to the ergodic case; see Theorem 13.5. Using the ideas of Cover, one can prove achievability. The converse given by Maurer [196] also applies to the ergodic case. the context symbols, however. This flexibility is provided in [294] , where four weighting methods are described. Here, we consider the two simplest classesclass IV and class III. To be more specific, we denote the context symbols for symbol x~by ZtI, Z12,. . . , Z~D. Observe that each of these symbols could be any symbol available at both the encoder and decoder while encoding/decoding xt; for example, the basic context-tree method corresponds to the assignment Ztcj =~On the other hand, if there is a "side-information" sequence available, then we could take z~j = Yt+d-1, but also combinations of both past z symbols and past and/or future y symbols are possible. In a class IV method, it is assumed that the actual probability of the next symbol Xt being 1 is based on the first d context symbols Ztl, Zt2, . . . , where d depends on the context z~, z12,. .. , Z~D that occurred; for example, if the source model corresponds to the tree in Fig.13 .6(a) and the context Ztl, Zt2, . . . ,~at time t is 011€. . . c, the probability~oii of the next symbol Xt being 1 can be found in the leaf 011. We have denoted a "don~t care" context symbol by E here. The subscript 011 refers to the values 0, 1, and 1 of the context symbols Zj 1, Zt2, and zt3. respectively.
Class III models can also be described using a tree. However, the ordering of the context symbols is not fixed as in class IV. For a source model corre sponding to the tree in Fig. 13 .6(b), when the context zti, Zf 2,. . , Z~D at time t is cOOls. . . e, the probability 9~of the next symbol Xt being 1 can be found in leaf 010. Note that the superscript 243 denotes the context ordering; that is, first Zt2 is used, then Zt4, and, finally, Zt 3. The subscript 010 now refers to the values 0, 1, and 0 of these context symbols Zt2, Zt4, and Zt3, respectively.
Context-weighting methods are based on splitting up the observations cor responding to the nodes in a data structure. In class IV methods, this splitting is done by first splitting according to the first context symbol, then splitting is done using the second context symbol, and so on: see Fig. 13 .6(a). In class III, each splitting operation can be performed according to all of the context symbols that have not been used in previous splittings; see Fig. 13.6(b) .
For both model classes, a CT\'V encoder (implicitly) specifies the con text structure and corresponding parameters to a decoder. This results in an increased codeword length or redundancy. The redundancy based on the pa rameter specification is called parameter redundancy. Specifying the context structure leads to model redundancy. It will be clear that class III methods are more general than class IV methods. Since they adapt better to the source, the performance of class III methods should therefore be better. Indeed the so-called parameter redundancy is smaller for class III than for class IV. but since class HI is richer than class IV, its model redundancy is also larger. It depends on the length of the source sequence which of the two effects will dominate. For small lengths, class IV methods will outperform the class III method. For large lengths, the effect of model redundancy becomes negligible and a class III method gives a smaller codeword length,
Analysis of Speckle Patterns
We use the methods that were described in the previous sections to estimate the mutual information between noisy speckle measurements. From [108] it is known that the two-point intensity correlations in a speckle pattern are translation invariant. Therefore, we may conclude that a speckle pattern can be modeled as a stationary process. Moreover, the process is also ergoclic clue to the statistical properties of speckle patterns; namely the spatial distribution of intensities is the same as the PUF ensemble distribution of intensities [136] . Therefore, the methods given in the previous sections are applicable.
The secrets are extracted from pre-processecl speckle patterns. Pre processing includes Gabor filtering at 45°, thresholding, and subsampling (see Section 16.5). As X-and Y-sequences we use 64 x 64 binary images. An example of a pair X. Y is depicted in Fig. 13.7 . We observe that the enrollment and verification images differ slightly due to the measurement noise. More over, we see that application of a 45°Gabor filter results in diagonal stripes. These stripes are caused by the high Gabor component correlations perpen clicular to the direction of the filter [287] . Since the correlation decreases with distance, it is natural to consider positions for context candidates as shown in Fig. 13.8 . This template turns out to have a good balance between per formance and complexity. We have also considered a larger template. How ever, using this larger template did not lead to smaller entropy estimates. We can calculate mutual information with two alternative formulas: either by estimating it as I(~)(X: Y) = H(~)(X) + H~(Y) -H(~)(XY) or as I(~)(X;Y) H(~)(X) -H(~)(XIY). Note that for each of the entropies involved in the formulas, we have to compress an image (or a pair of images) using a CTW method. In what follows we describe in more detail the analysis that we have conducted. 1. The basic approach that we have used is based on the template shown in Fig. 13.8 . This template contains four context positions. Using the class IV method, we have determined codeword lengths .)~(X) and~(Y) and the joint codeword length ?~(XY). Note that A(XY) results from compressing a quaternary image, since both symbols in a XY symbol pair are binary. Using the symmetric mutual information formula, we computed a mutual information estimate for each of tIme 10 experiments ("AU," "Al," "BO," etc.). Table 13 .1(a) lists these estimates in the column labeled "bas." Table 13 .2(a) shows the results for the corresponding entropy estimates H(X), H(Y), and H(XY). The mutual information averaged over the 10 experiments turns out to be 0.2911 bit/pixel. Figure 13 .9 shows the codeword lengths for experiment AU.
2. The second approach is based on the assumption that the statistics of binarized Gabor-filtered speckle patterns are symmetric; that is, the prob ability of a binary symbol x given context C1, C2, c3, and C4 is the same as the probability of 1 -x given 1 -c1, 1 -c2, 1 -c3, and 1 -a4, respectively. There are good reasons for this assumption. Although the statistics of the original, unfiltered speckle pattern are not symmetric under dark~-*bright reversal (due to the exponential intensity distribution [136]), the bina rization of the Gabor coefficients discards most of the asymmetry-related effects.
The symmetry assumption reduces the number of parameters that need to he handled by the CTW method and, therefore, should result in more reliable estimates of the enfropy and, consequently, more reliable estimates of the mutual information. From comparison of the column "sym" and column "bas" in Table 13 .2(a) we conclude that the symmetry assumption implies that the symmetry assumption is reasonable. The corresponding estimates of the mutual information are listed in the column "syrn" in Table 13 .1(a). From Table 13 .1(a) we see that the average of the 10 "sym" estimates is larger than the average found using the basic approach. More specifically, 9 out of 10 estimates are larger than for the basic approach.
3. In the third approach, we have increased the template size from four to six context symbols; see Fig. 13 .10. Just as in the previous approach. we assumed symmetry of the statistics. The resulting entropy estimates (col umn "sym+lar") show that we do not gaul from increasing the template size.
13 Entropy Estimation for Optical PUFs Based on CTW Methods 231 4. In the fourth approach, we have determined the mutual information using the conditional formula I(X;Y) H(X) -H(XIY). To determine the codeword length .)~(XIY), we selected seven context symbols in total from both the X and Y images. The resulting template is shown in Fig. 13.11 . Again, we assumed that the statistics are symmetric. This method leads to higher mutual information estimates than the estimates based on H(X) + H(Y) -H(XY); see the column labeled "sym+con."
Class III Analysis
The same analysis was performed using the class III CTW method. We used the same context positions as earlier, but note that the ordering is irrelevant x~jj I5I4k A 2~6 Fig. 13 .11. Tertiplate showing the context symbols and their ordering for compu tation of )~(X~Y). The current position (X) in the X image corresponds to position 1 in the Y image.
now. Tables 13.2(b) and 13.1(b) describe the results of the class III analysis. Just as in class IV, the estimates based on the symmetry assumption are more reliable than those obtained from the basic approach. Moreover, for class III, a larger template does not improve the estimates and also here the conditional formula leads to the highest mutual information estimates. From the entropy Table 13 .2, we may conclude that the entropy estimates for class III are smaller and, consequently, more reliable than the estimates for class IV. Therefore, we have more confidence in the mutual information esti mates obtained from class III weighting methods than from class IV methods. The difference between corresponding estimates is always quite small. These small differences can be explained by noting that the template ordering was optimized to perform well for class IV methods.
Remark 13.1. Looking at the entropy estimates in Table 13 .2, we notice that for both class IV and class HI models, H(XY) -H(Y) > H(XJY). From this we conclude that the conditional entropy estimate from~.(XfY) is more reli able than the estimate from .\(XY) -A(Y). As a consequence, the conditional formula for mutual information does lead to more accurate estimates than the symmetric formula.
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In the present chapter we have focused on estimating the secrecy rate from 450 Gabor images. It is obvious that similar estimates can be found for images that result from 1350 Gabor filtering. The 45°and 1350 Gabor images are very weakly correlated to each other [287] , representing almost independent data, but their statistics are equivalent and, therefore, it is possible to compress both images using the same context tree [150] . The estimates obtained in this way are, in principle, more reliable than estimates based only on 45°Gabor images.
The secrecy rate estimates obtained in this chapter are significantly larger (approximately by a factor of 7) than those obtained with the schemes pro posed in Chapter 16. This indicates that there is still much room for improve ment in designing secret-key extraction techniciues.
Finally, we mention that techniques like the ones that we have applied here can be used to estimate the identification capacity of biometric systems [292]: see also Chapter 4.
We have used CTW methods to estimate the secrecy rate of binarized Gabor filtered speckle patterns obtained from optical PUFs. Several alternative approaches lead to the conclusion that secrecy rates of 0.31 bit/pixel are possi ble. This corresponds to 0.7 bit per average speckle area. (The average speckle width is approximately 12 pixels in the unfiltered image; see Section 15.3.1).
Class III gives more reliable and slightly higher estimates of the secrecy rate than class IV, since it is based on a richer model class than class IV. In theory, our methods only converge to the entropy for asymptotically large images if there is no bound on the context size. Note that we have definitively not reached this situation here.
